Foreign Affairs article based on “Pier Competitor”

ABSTRACT: China lacks the network of foreign military bases that typically attends great-power expansion, yet its armed forces operate at an increasingly global scale. How has the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) managed this feat without a significant footprint on foreign soil? Why has Chinese leadership not (yet) established a network of bases to address security threats to China’s overseas interests? This article analyzes the structural constraints facing China’s military basing abroad and then examines the methods by which the PLA has nonetheless achieved significant global power-projection capability. It highlights the capacity provided by international maritime transport infrastructure owned and operated by Chinese firms as a viable—yet limited—means of securing national interests overseas with military power. The study demonstrates that the structural setting and historical sequence of China’s rise render foreign military bases relatively costly, incentivizing alternative modes of access and power projection in the maritime domain.

ABSTRACT: China is a leader in the global transportation industry, with an especially significant position in ocean ports. An empirical analysis of PRC positions in foreign ports reveals that Chinese firms own or operate terminal assets in ninety-six ports in fifty-three countries. An original dataset of Chinese firms' overseas port holdings documents the geographic distribution, ownership, and operational characteristics of these ports. What are the international security implications of China's global port expansion? An investigation of Chinese firms' ties to the Party-state reveals multiple mechanisms by which the Chinese leadership may direct the use of commercial port assets for strategic purposes. International port terminals that Chinese firms own and operate already provide dual-use capabilities to the People's Liberation Army during peacetime, establishing logistics and intelligence networks that materially enable China to project power into critical regions worldwide. But this form of networked state power is limited in wartime because it depends on commercial facilities in non-allied states. By providing evidence that overseas bases are not the sole index of global power projection capabilities, findings advance research on the identification and measurement of sources of national power. China's leveraging of PRC firms' transnational commercial port network constitutes an underappreciated but consequential form of state power projection. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00433

SUMMARY: Chinese firms are now leading builders, bankers, owners, and operators of ports in Africa. They have quickly achieved significant scale and scope across the continent, using modern, deepwater ports to drive Chinese trade and promote investment in other economic projects past the pier. Several state-owned enterprises have been moving up the value chain in the sector, taking long-term control over ownership and operations of port assets instead of just building them on contracts. Such ports provide robust platforms for China’s economic, political, and diplomatic access in Africa. They also establish ready sites for civil-military dual use. Chinese companies evidently pursue these projects to access African markets and resources, but also to advance broader Chinese foreign policy goals that are competitive with U.S. interests in Africa. https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-ports-in-africa/

OVERVIEW: The United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission convened a daylong hearing on the global power-projection capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on 20 February 2020. What follows is a version of the testimony with which the author responded to the commission’s questions on Chinese bases and access points, drawing on an original data set of the ninety-five overseas port terminals that Chinese firms—primarily three entities, two of which are central state–owned enterprises—own, operate, or both. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/11

This chapter analyzes the status and trajectory of overseas logistics facilities to support PLA operations abroad, focusing on discussions within the PRC strategic community about how to establish an overseas support system without a network of military bases. The approach observed to be taking hold in practice is the strategic strongpoint model, which provides significant support for many peacetime missions but has limited utility for high-end combat. PRC analysts envision limited PLA utilization of a network of commercial port facilities for dual-use functions—largely in the form of logistics and intelligence support for PLAN missions overseas. Although formal military bases abroad would enable greater expeditionary capabilities for PLA forces, the Chinese strategic community remains circumspect about how much this goal should crowd out others. The choice of overt militarization of commercial projects that could facilitate high-intensity combat missions would be a major departure from the “peaceful development” path of commerce-led expansion long favored by the PRC leadership.

The chapter is organized into three main sections. The first section examines Chinese debates over appropriate methods for projecting power abroad. The second section considers proposals for developing strategic strongpoints [战略支点], which are distinguished from past models by the deliberate reliance on and integration with commercial facilities built, operated, and/or owned by Chinese enterprises. The third section addresses some of the advantages and disadvantages of this proposed model in light of the requirements for conducting and sustaining operations beyond the mainland and its immediate periphery. The conclusion summarizes the findings and anticipates some geopolitical factors that could drive trends in future PLA overseas basing and logistics. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/PLA-Beyond-Borders/

SUMMARY: This report analyzes PRC economic and military interests and activities in Djibouti. The small, east African nation is the site of the PLA’s first overseas military base, but also serves as a major commercial hub for Chinese firms—especially in the transport and logistics industry. We explain the synthesis of China’s commercial and strategic goals in Djibouti through detailed examination of the development and operations of commercial ports and related infrastructure. Employing the “Shekou Model” of comprehensive port zone development, Chinese firms have flocked to Djibouti with the intention of transforming it into a gateway to the markets and resources of Africa—especially landlocked Ethiopia—and a transport hub for trade between Europe and Asia. With diplomatic and financial support from Beijing, PRC firms have established a China-friendly business ecosystem and a political environment that proved conducive to the establishment of a permanent military presence. The Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission that justified the original PLA deployment in the region is now only one of several missions assigned to Chinese armed forces at Djibouti, a contingent that includes marines and special forces. The PLA is broadly responsible for the security of China’s “overseas interests,” for which Djibouti provides essential logistical support. China’s first overseas strategic strongpoint at Djibouti is a secure commercial foothold on the African continent and a military platform for expanding PLA operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/6

SUMMARY: Gwadar is an inchoate “strategic strongpoint” in Pakistan that may one day serve as a major platform for China’s economic, diplomatic, and military interactions across the northern Indian Ocean region. As of August 2020, it is not a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base, but rather an underdeveloped and underutilized commercial multipurpose port built and operated by Chinese companies in service of broader PRC foreign and domestic policy objectives. Foremost among PRC objectives for Gwadar are (1) to enable direct transport between China and the Indian Ocean, and (2) to anchor an effort to stabilize western China by shoring up insecurity on its periphery. To understand these objectives, this case study first analyzes the characteristics and functions of the port, then evaluates plans for hinterland transport infrastructure connecting it to markets and resources. We then examine the linkage between development in Pakistan and security in Xinjiang. Finally, we consider the military potential of the Gwadar site, evaluating why it has not been utilized by the PLA then examining a range of uses that the port complex may provide for Chinese naval operations. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/7